Bank lending booms and asset price booms are often intertwined. Although a fundamental shock might trigger an asset boom, aggressive lending can push asset prices higher, leading to more lending, and so on. Such a dynamic seems to have characterized the agricultural land boom surrounding World War I. This paper examines i) how banks responded to the asset price boom and how they were affected by the bust; ii) how various banking regulations and policies influenced those effects; and iii) how bank lending contributed to rising farm land values in the boom, and how bank closures contributed to falling prices in the bust. We find that rising crop prices encouraged bank entry and balance sheet expansion in agricultural counties. State deposit insurance systems amplified the impact of rising crop prices on the size and risk of bank portfolios, while higher minimum capital requirements dampened the effects. Further, increases in county farm land values were correlated with increases in bank loans during the boom. When farm land prices collapsed, banks that had responded most aggressively to the asset boom had a higher probability of closing, while counties with more bank closures experienced larger declines in land prices than can be explained by falling crop prices alone. January 18, 2018 JEL codes: E58, N21, N22
1

Introduction
Asset price booms and busts are often intertwined with lending booms and busts.
Although possibly triggered by a fundamental shock, rising asset prices can lead to increased lending and leverage, which in turn causes asset prices to rise further, leading to more lending, and so on. Similarly, falling asset prices can force debt contraction and deleveraging that reinforce the decline in asset prices.
1 Large declines in asset prices can be disruptive, especially when they involve real estate or other highly-leveraged assets, as they often produce financial crises, bank failures, tighter credit conditions, and slower economic growth (e.g. , Kindleberger 1978; Minsky 1986; Borio and Lowe 2002; Mian and Sufi 2009; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Schularick and Taylor 2012) . The interrelationship between asset price and lending booms raises important policy questions, including how various regulations or policies might affect the vulnerability of the banking system to asset price shocks, and how bank lending or instability might exacerbate asset price movements.
This paper studies the interplay of bank lending and asset prices in a prototypical boombust cycle affecting U.S. agricultural land prices during and after World War I. In a recent study of the episode, Rajan and Ramcharan (2015) find that credit availability contributed to changes in farm land prices, both directly and by amplifying the impact of fundamentals on land prices.
Counties with more banks experienced larger increases in farm land prices and mortgage debt during the boom and suffered larger price declines and more bank failures during the bust.
Whereas Rajan and Ramcharan examine the effects of credit availability on land prices, we focus here on how banks responded to the boom and bust, and whether state banking policies affected those responses. Our study thus provides insights about the channels by which the asset boom and bust affected the banking system and supply of credit as well as how banks contributed to the increase and collapse of asset prices.
As Rajan and Ramcharan and others have noted, the World War I episode provides a convenient environment for studying the dynamics of a boom and bust. The farm land price boom had a clearly exogenous trigger-the wartime collapse of European agricultural production. The resulting sharp increase in farm output prices spurred large gains in U.S. farm land prices, supported by a substantial increase in farm mortgage debt, as farmers and their 1 Theoretical descriptions of how credit cycles can amplify real shocks include Rajan (1994) , Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , Geanakoplos (2010) , and Nuňo and Thomas (2017) .
2 lenders apparently expected that farm incomes and land prices would remain high indefinitely.
However, the boom was short-lived. European production recovered quickly after the war, driving down farm output prices and land values in the United States. Reduced farm incomes and land values triggered a wave of farm foreclosures and bank failures in the early 1920s (Johnson 1974; Alston 1983; Alston, Grove and Wheelock 1994) .
A second advantage of studying the historical episode for insights about the interrelationships between lending and asset price booms and busts is that bank lending at the time was decidedly local. Federal law prohibited interstate branch banking, and most states either prohibited or severely restricted branching within their borders. The resulting structure meant that banks were closely tied to their local economy and many lacked the diversification or scale necessary to weather adverse shocks. Moreover, with the automobile still in its infancy and paved roads almost nonexistent in rural areas, it would have been impractical for most farmers to obtain services from a bank located more than a few miles from their home. Thus, the prevalence of unit banking ensures that the balance sheet information we observe for individual banks mainly reflects their lending to local farmers. 2 At the same time, we can approximate local income shocks using detailed information about crop production in the county in which a bank was located. Specifically, we calculate a county-specific farm output price shock by applying the annual changes in the prices of 11 major crops to the county output shares of each crop before the war. This provides exogenous variation both across time and within a state to identify the effects of the price shock.
Our study uses detailed, biennial balance sheet data for individual banks in 18 agricultural states for 1908-20 to examine how the price shock affected the establishment of new banks and the portfolio decisions of existing banks, as well as how the ultimate collapse of farm prices and incomes drove banks to close. By aggregating the individual bank balance sheet data to the county-level, we are also able to directly observe the links between bank lending and increases in farm land values during the boom, and between bank closures and declines in farm land values during the subsequent bust.
2 The county is a reasonable approximation of the area constituting a rural banking market at the time. Most empirical studies define banking markets at the MSA or rural county level even in modern times. Bank regulators sometimes define rural banking markets over larger areas when evaluating the competitive implications of proposed bank mergers and acquisitions, but the county is still the basic unit for defining a rural banking market.
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Our research also examines whether banking policies amplified or mitigated the impact of asset price shocks on bank entry, lending, and stability. Prior research finds that deposit insurance contributed to banking instability in the 1920s (e.g., Calomiris 1992; Wheelock 1992a Wheelock , 1992b Alston, Grove and Wheelock 1994; Wheelock and Wilson 1995; Dehajia and LlerasMuney 2007; Calomiris and Jaremski 2018) . 3 Other banking regulations at the time included minimum capital requirements (White 1984) and extended liability laws (Grossman 2001) which, along with membership in the Federal Reserve System, might have affected banks' incentives or ability to take risks and in turn affect the stability of the banking system.
Our results show that the banking system responded to rising crop prices and farm land values, both in terms new bank entry and balance sheet expansion of previously established banks. Further, we find that deposit insurance amplified the effects of rising crop prices on bank loan and asset volumes. By contrast, higher minimum capital requirements tended to deter entry and dampen the impact of changes in crop prices on the total loans and assets of banks, whereas extended liability laws and Federal Reserve membership had small and somewhat ambiguous effects.
The collapse of farm prices and incomes brought a wave of bank failures, mergers, and voluntary liquidations in the early 1920s. In addition to the effects of falling local farm land values, we find that a bank's probability of closing was higher, the larger the increase in its loan portfolio during the boom. Banks with insured deposits were also more likely to close. Similar to studies on other periods, we find that a bank's closure probability was also positively correlated with its leverage and loans/assets ratio, and negatively correlated with its size, age, and liquidity/assets ratio. Further, for a given decline in local farm land values, a bank's closure probability was higher in counties that had larger increases in land values during the boom. Thus, we find evidence that banks are more vulnerable when declines in asset prices follow asset price booms than when prices fall after a period of relatively stable prices.
Aggregating the bank data to the county-level, we find that the banking system reinforced the impact of the agricultural price shock on farm land prices in both the boom and the bust. shows that banks can both be affected by and contribute to asset price booms and busts, and that banking regulations and policies can influence the feedback loop around such events.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides historical background about the World War I boom/bust and the structure of the U.S. banking system at the time. Section 3 describes the data we use to estimate the interrelationship between banks and the boom/bust. Sections 4 and 5 examine the impact of the agricultural boom and bank regulation on the establishment of new banks and the balance sheets of previously established banks. Section 6 investigates the impact of the run up and collapse of farm land values on bank closures. Section 7 examines the role of banks in fueling the farm land price boom and subsequent collapse. Section 8 concludes.
Background
In agricultural regions, fluctuations in farm output prices and incomes importantly influence the demand for funds and profit opportunities for local banks. The early 1900s were generally good years for farmers. Prosperity brought more land under cultivation and rising farm populations, as well as substantial growth in the number of commercial banks in farming communities. Because most states prohibited or severely restricted branch banking, market entry was almost solely in the form of new banks. 4 Across the United States, the total number of banks more than doubled from 13,053 in 1900 to 27,864 in 1914; the South and Great Plains regions experienced increases of more than 200 percent (Board of Governors 1959, p. 33).
World War I transformed good years for farmers and their banks into boom years. Crop prices rose rapidly during the war as the demand for U.S. agricultural products soared. Shown in the top panel of Figure 1 , between 1914 and 1919, the unweighted average of 11 crop prices rose by 160 percent. The extent and timing of increases in the prices of individual crops varied, as 4 Banks with federal charters, i.e., national banks, were prohibited from opening branch offices, as were statechartered banks in most states, which hampered diversification and tied banks to the fortunes of their local communities. Calomiris (2000, Ch. 1) argues that northern farmers in particular opposed branch banking to ensure that local banks would continue to lend to them bad times as well as during prosperous periods, and in a 1924 referendum, voters in Illinois soundly rejected branch banking (White 1984) . Indeed, fewer than 175 new branches were established outside head office cities in the Great Plains, Midwest, and South between 1910 and 1920 (Board of Governors 1959 5 shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1 . The prices of cotton, flaxseed, Irish potatoes, and tobacco rose by more than 200 percent, while those of oats, rye, sweet potatoes, and buckwheat increased by less than 100 percent.
The wartime boom in farm output prices and incomes drove increases in land prices and mortgage debt, and drew still more banks to farming communities. Across the United States, more than 3,000 banks were chartered during or shortly after the war, bringing the total to an alltime high of more than 31,000 banks, or about one bank for every 3,500 persons, in 1921. As one might expect, land values increased most in agricultural regions whose principal crops had the largest price gains (i.e., cotton, tobacco, and buckwheat) and where there was less available land to bring into production.
The second column of Governors (1959) . We divide the number of banks by state population in 1920 from the U.S. Census. 6 See also Jones and Durand (1954) or Johnson (1974) . 7 The average term of farm mortgage loans recorded by banks during 1917-21 was 2.7 years, ranging from 1.4 years in the South to nearly 5 years in New England (Horton, Larsen, and Wall 1942, Calomiris and Jaremski (2018) find that insured banks generally had faster loan growth rates than uninsured banks during the boom, but those located in regions where farm output prices rose the most had especially rapid growth rates. Deposit insurance also 9 Suspensions include banks that failed or otherwise suspended operations on account of financial difficulties. Some banks that suspended later reopened, though most did not. 10 State legislatures often set low minimum capital requirements to encourage banks to open in even the smallest communities, whereas higher national bank minimums prevented them from entering many small towns (White 1983) . 11 Before 1914, national banks were generally prohibited from real estate lending. However, the Federal Reserve Act (38 Stat. 251, 273), Section 24, specified "Any national banking association not situated in a central reserve city may make loans secured by improved and unencumbered farm land … but no such loan shall be made for a longer time than five years, nor for an amount exceeding fifty per centum of the actual value of the property offered as security. Any such bank may make such loans in an aggregate sum equal to twenty-five per centum of its capital and surplus or to one third of its time deposits…." A 1916 amendment clarified that farm mortgages made by national banks against property other than farm land could have a term of no more than one year. 12 Oklahoma (1908) , Texas and Kansas (1909 ), Nebraska (1911 ), South Dakota (1916 ), and North Dakota (1918 form a column down the middle of the country. The two geographic outliers (Mississippi in 1914 and Washington in 1917) apparently adopted deposit insurance quickly in reaction to increases in bank failures (Robb 1921 14 The remainder of this paper attempts to fill out the story of the World War I agricultural price shock by examining how banks responded to the boom, how banks fared during the bust, and how the presence of banks and their lending influenced the course of farm land values.
Data
To examine the effects of the World War I agricultural boom and subsequent bust on banks, we merge county-level census data with bank-level balance sheet data. Our sample includes only states in the South, Midwest, and Great Plains regions that published bank-level information so as to focus on a balanced sample of locations where farming was a large share of economic activity. And, to focus further on farming areas within those regions (rather than urban 13 Waburton (1959) describes how the collapse of farm incomes led to an increase in bank failures and the demise of state deposit insurance systems, and Calomiris (1992) finds that deposit insurance worsened the contraction of bank deposits during the 1920s and the losses suffered by depositors of failed banks. Alston, Grove and Wheelock (1994) , Wheelock (1992b) , Wheelock and Wilson (1995) and Hooks and Robinson (2002) find that deposit insurance increased bank failure rates in the 1920s. Chung and Richardson (2006) find that suspensions due to mismanagement were higher in states with deposit insurance systems than elsewhere. 14 Anderson et al. (2018) find that larger state banks and those which provided services for other banks were more likely to join the Federal Reserve System. Additionally, they find that state banks that did become members tended to increase loans as a share of their total assets and reduce their liquid assets. Similarly, Carlson and Wheelock (2017) find that the balance sheets of national banks were generally less liquid after the Fed's establishment than before, suggesting that banks responded to the Fed's founding by shifting toward less liquid loans and securities.
and manufacturing centers) we include only counties that (1) had no city with a population over 25,000, (2) at least 250 farms, and (3) over 15,000 improved farm acres.
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The county-level census dataset contains economic and demographic information for 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1925. 16 Of particular interest is the county-level output of each farm crop.
Combining output data for 1910 with annual information on prices for 11 individual crops (corn, wheat, oats, barley, rye, buckwheat, flaxseed, cotton, tobacco, Irish potatoes, and sweet potatoes)
from Carter et al. (2006), we form a county-specific crop price index for each year: As the county-level basket of crops is held constant in 1910, CropIndex c,t has the benefit of being exogenous to the actions of local banks. Of course, output levels and crop mix likely changed in response to rising farm incomes, changes in relative prices, and bank loan supply. By holding crop mix constant, we avoid any reverse causality that local lending or changes in land values might have had on the measured crop price shock. Moreover, using national average crop prices to calculate the price index avoids any effects that local conditions would have had on county-level prices. Figure 2 illustrates the county-level geographic variation in the crop price index and the percentage change in farm land value during the war. 17 The top panel of Figure 2 shows that the South, where cotton and tobacco were the dominant crops, and the upper Midwest, where 15 The cutoff points for farms and improved acres were chosen to eliminate the bottom 5 percent of the distribution. The population cutoff was chosen because the Census provided the number of people living in places with more than 25,000 for every county. 16 The data were assembled by Haines (2004) . We aggregate counties to their 1910 boundaries so as to have consistent county definitions over time.
17 Figure 2 presents the county-level aggregates for all counties in the South, Midwest, and Great Plains regardless whether bank-level data exist for the state. We do this to show that the pattern is visible over all states rather than in just the states for which we observe bank-level balance sheet information. 
Responding to the Price Shock: Establishment of New Banks
One impact the price shock might have had on the banking system was to spur bank entry. Federal and state prohibitions on branching meant that the establishment of new banks, rather than new branches of existing banks, was the dominant form of entry. The number of banks in the United States increased rapidly in the years leading up to World War I, and many more banks opened during the war years, especially in the South and Great Plains regions.
We estimate a linear regression to investigate the impact of the agricultural price shock on the rate of bank entry at the county-level. The dependent variable is the number of new banks established during a two-year period divided by the number of banks that were present in the county at the end of the prior period. The main explanatory variable is the crop price index measured at the end of each prior period. The model, which we estimate using biennial data from 1908 to 1920 (where entry during 1908-09 is the first observation), is:
, * , −1 + 4 , + + + , (1) where , is the rate of bank entry in county c during the biennial period t, , −1 is the crop price index in county c at the end of the previous biennial period,
, is a vector of bank regulation in county c in biennial period t including a dummy variable for whether the state had an active deposit insurance system, a dummy variable for whether the state imposed double liability on state bank shareholders, and a dummy variable for whether the state had a minimum capital requirement of more than $10,000 on state banks.
, is a vector of county-specific census control variables for county c in the biennial period t, is a vector of year fixed effects, is a vector of county fixed effects, and , is a robust error term. As the county fixed effects control for location characteristics that are constant over time, Equation (1) includes only those census control variables that vary over time. These include the logarithms of county population and manufacturing output per person, the fraction of county population living in a city or town of 2,500 or more persons, the fractions of county population that are non-white, illiterate, or 15 years of age or younger, the number of national banks in the county at the beginning of the period, and the number of state banks in the county at the beginning of the period. that the coefficients on the levels capture the effects of any changes in the policy. While these effects are important, there were few changes during our period of study. 21 Hence, we focus on the interactions, which indicate how the presence of a particular policy affected the impact of the crop price shock on bank entry rates. The interactions of the crop price index with the policy variables in Equation (1) capture the interplay of factors related to entry barriers and economic opportunities. The interactions test whether the banking policies affected the impact of a given agricultural price shock on bank entry, and are largely independent from the effect of the initial adoption of a given policy.
Because they faced substantially different regulations, we estimate Equation (1) separately for state and national banks. Although national banks were not subject to state banking regulations, we include the state policy interactions as explanatory variables when estimating Equation (1) for national banks because differences between state and national bank regulations likely influenced the charter decision of prospective bankers, as White (1983) shows for the 1920s.
The results, which are reported in Table 3 , indicate that crop prices had a positive and statistically significant impact on the entry rate of state banks, but not of national banks. The coefficients shown in the first column of each set indicate that a doubling of the crop price index would lead to a 7.6 percent increase in state bank entry rates and an insignificant 2.5 percent decrease in national bank entry rates. Because they generally faced higher minimum capital requirements and tighter restrictions on mortgage lending than state banks, national banks were more likely to open in larger cities and towns, and less likely to lend directly to farmers in rural areas. Hence, the larger impact of the agricultural price shock on the establishment of state banks than on national banks is not surprising.
21 Among our sample states, deposit insurance systems were established in Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. State banks were required to join the deposit insurance systems in all of these states except Kansas, where membership was voluntary. National banks were not permitted to join state deposit insurance systems. At the time, national bank shareholders were also subject to double liability. Several our our sample states also imposed double liability on state banks, including Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wisconsin, but only Mississippi and Ohio adopted double liability during our sample period. Finally, nine states set minimum capital requirements for their state banks at $10,000 (or $5000 in the case of North Carolina), while three had minimums above $10,000 ($15,000 in Alabama, Florida and $25,000 in Ohio). Six states changed their minimums between 1910 and 1920, but only four crossed the $10,000 threshold: Illinois decreased from $25,000 to $10,000; Michigan decreased from $20,000 to $10,000; Nebraska increased from $10,000 to $15,000; South Dakota increased from $10,000 to $15,000. The identities of states that imposed double liability is from Grossman (2001) . Information on minimum capital requirements is from White (1983) and Rand McNally Bankers Directory.
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We find evidence that some banking policies also affected entry rates. Specifically, minimum capital requirements appear to have been an effective barrier to state bank entry as states that imposed relatively high requirements saw less new state bank formation. For a given value of the crop price index, the entry rate of state-chartered banks in the eight sample states that set a minimum capital requirement above $10,000 was approximately one-half the entry rate in states with lower minimums. The minimums imposed on state banks also affected entry rates for national banks, with national bank entry rates being some 7-10 percent higher in states with minimum capital requirements above $10,000 (national banks were subject to uniform minimum capital requirements across all states that varied only by the population of the city in which the bank was located). By contrast, we find no evidence that the presence of a deposit insurance system affected state bank entry, either directly or by impacting the effect of a crop price shock on entry rates. However, the results indicate that deposit insurance somewhat reduced the impact of the crop price shock on national bank entry rates. 22 Double liability statutes do not appear to have consistently affected the impact of crop prices on the establishment of either bank type.
Responding to the Price Shock: Balance Sheets of Banks Established before the War
In addition to encouraging the formation of new banks, rising farm prices and incomes likely affected the growth rates, and possibly the portfolio allocations, of banks that were established before the war. Using bank-level balance sheet data, we examine how the agricultural price shock affected the growth of total assets and loans, as well as ratios of loans to assets (loans/assets), paid-in capital, surplus, and undivided profits to assets (capital/assets), liquid reserves to assets (cash/assets), and bonds and stocks to assets (bonds/assets) of banks. Many studies across many settings find that bank failure risk is correlated with these ratios, as well as with rapid growth of loans and bank size (measured, for example, by total assets). Thus, the analysis provides evidence about whether banks' response to the boom contributed to instability in the banking system by increasing bank failure risk.
Because of differences between state and federal regulation and other banking policies,
we again estimate the model separately for national banks and state banks. 23 Our data consist of biennial observations from 1908 through 1920 for banks that were established in 1914 or before.
We omit the first observation for banks that opened between 1908 and 1914 because the balance sheets of new banks are typically highly idiosyncratic. The model is as follows:
, , = + 1 , + 2 , + 3 , * , −1 + 4 , + 5 , * 1918 + + + , , (2) where , , is one of the specified balance sheet variables for bank i in county c during biennial period t, 1918 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in 1918 and 0 otherwise, is a vector of bank-fixed effects, , , is the error term clustered by county, , now contains all the previous variables with the addition of the numbers of state and national banks in the current year,
, now contains a dummy variable for Federal Reserve membership during biennial period t, and the rest of the variables retain their previous definitions. In these regressions, we include the interaction between the crop price index and the 1918 dummy to control for any differential effects of the price shock on banks when the United States was at war. During the war, the U.S. government and Federal Reserve encouraged banks to purchase large amounts of government bonds and to provide funds to help their customers buy bonds (Meltzer 2003, pp. 84-90) . This pressure might have altered how banks responded to rising crop prices in those years. Table 4 reports estimates of Equation (2) for state banks. The basic specification in the first column of each set reveals a positive and statistically significant impact of the crop price index on total assets and total loans. A doubling of the crop price index is estimated to increase a state bank's assets by 21.5 percent and loans by 23.7 percent. Further, the coefficients on the crop price index are positive for loans/assets, cash/assets, and negative for capital/assets and bonds/assets. Specifically, a doubling of the crop price index is estimated to increase loans/assets by 1.2 percentage points, decrease capital/assets by 2.3 percentage points, increase cash/assets by 1.1 percentage points, and decrease bonds/assets by 3.8 percentage points. Hence, the results suggest that, on average, state banks in the sample responded to booming agricultural prices by shifting their asset portfolios away from bonds toward loans and cash reserves, and by increasing their leverage (i.e., by lowering capital/assets).
Quantitatively, the effects are modest, though statistically significant, and somewhat ambiguous about whether banks that were established before the war responded to the boom by increasing their overall risk. Higher loans/assets, and lower capital/assets and bond/assets is indicative of higher risk, but higher cash/assets would imply lower liquidity risk. Finally, we find 15 that the impacts of a given crop price index value on state bank loans, loans/assets, and capital/assets were significantly lower in 1918 compared with other years, while the impacts on total assets, cash/assets and bonds/assets were much larger in that year.
The second and third columns of each set of regressions include banking policy variables and an indicator for whether the bank was a member of the Federal Reserve System. As previously discussed, due to the inclusion of bank fixed effects, the estimated impacts of these policy variables are associated with the few changes in regulations that occurred during the sample period and should be carefully interpreted. The baseline regressions reported in the second column of each set indicate that the adoption of double liability exerted downward pressure on total assets, total loans, and loans/assets, and upward pressure on capital/assets, cash/assets, and bonds/assets. Not surprisingly, the adoption of a higher minimum capital requirement increased bank size, reflected in total assets and total loans, as well as higher loans/assets. The establishment of deposit insurance also was associated with more total assets and loans, as well as with higher loans/assets.
Federal Reserve membership was required of all national banks at the System's inception in 1914, but membership was optional for state-chartered banks. The second column of each regression set indicates that, controlling for the crop price shock and state banking policy variables, Fed membership tended to be associated with lower total loans, loans/assets and bonds/assets, but somewhat higher capital/assets. Of course, because membership was optional for state banks, the direction of causality is ambiguous. Few state banks joined the Federal Reserve System, and those which did join tended to be located in larger cities and generate relatively more of their income from providing payments and other services to other banks (Anderson et al. 2018 ).
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Focusing on the interactions of the policy variables with the crop price index in the third column of each set, the negative coefficients on the interaction of the minimum capital requirement dummy variable with the crop price index indicate that the impact of a given crop price index value on total loans, total assets, and loans/assets was smaller in states with relatively high minimum capital requirements. Recall that we also find that higher minimum capital requirements suppressed state bank entry. To the extent that higher minimums gave rural banks a degree of local monopoly power, they likely encouraged conservative behavior and hence less asset and loan expansion in response to a local price shock.
The positive coefficients on the interaction of double liability with the crop price index indicates that double liability tended to boost the impact of crop prices on assets, loans, and loans/assets. This result seems consistent with Grossman (2001) , who finds that double liability generally reduced risk taking except in periods of heightened financial distress, such as the early 1920s. Grossman notes that double liability was eventually eliminated in the 1930s because it was widely viewed as ineffective at containing banking system risk.
Finally, deposit insurance seems to have amplified the impact of crop prices on total loans and assets of banks in state deposit insurance systems. Moreover, the results indicate that insured banks increased their loans/assets ratios and reduced their capital/assets ratios more in response to a given price shock than did uninsured state banks. Thus, the results support prior studies in finding that deposit insurance increased bank risk taking in the 1910s and 1920s. Table 5 reports estimates of Equation (2) The results indicate that the impact of crop prices on national bank assets, cash/assets, and bonds/assets was larger after banks had become Fed members, but the impact of crop prices on total loans and loans/assets was smaller (i.e., closer to zero). However, since all national banks were required to become members of the Federal Reserve System when the System was established in 1914, the interaction cannot clearly separate the effect of becoming a Fed member from the effect of the beginning of World War I.
The results also indicate that national banks tended to be larger in terms of total loans and assets in states where state banks were subject to higher minimum capital requirements, and that higher minimum capital requirements dampened the impact of crop prices on loans, assets and loans/assets, similar to their effect on state banks. The results thus indicate that higher minimum 17 capital requirements tended to dampen expansion of the banking system in response to fundamental shocks. The effects on national banks of double liability or deposit insurance regimes for state banks were more mixed. However, as with state banks, deposit insurance tended to amplify the impact of crop prices on total loans and assets. Finally, the interactions of the crop price index with the dummy variable for 1918 indicate that the crop price shock had larger, positive impacts on total bank assets, total loans and cash/assets in that year, but smaller effects on loans/assets, capital/assets, and bonds/assets.
Our results reveal several dynamics about the boom. First, we find that the agricultural price shock produced large increases in the assets and loans of state banks that were already established in 1914. The results are somewhat ambiguous, however, as to whether these banks responded to rising crop prices by taking on greater balance sheet risk. Second, crop prices had much less impact on the total loans and assets of national banks, likely because of their more limited role in financing agriculture. The differential response of state and national banks indicates that our crop price index likely reflects the agricultural price shock rather than other factors correlated with World War I. Third, our findings indicate that bank regulations and policies affected the response of state banks to the price shock, and even the response of national banks to some extent. High minimum capital requirements lessened the impact of rising farm output prices on the growth of bank balance sheets and balance sheet ratios correlated with risk, whereas deposit insurance amplified those effects.
Which Banks Closed?
Farm output prices collapsed in 1920 and farm land values quickly followed. With much lower incomes, many farmers were unable to repay mortgages and other loans incurred during We estimate a probit model to examine the determinants of bank closures between 1920 and 1924. Our specification is similar to those estimated in other settings, such as the Great Depression (White 1984 ), 1980s-90s (Wheelock and Wilson 1995 2000) , and Great Recession (Cole and White 2012) , in which closure outcome is regressed on various balance sheet measures and bank age intended to capture bank performance and risk. Small, unit banks are at greater risk of closing due to limited diversification and perhaps weaker management, and thus we expect that larger size reduces the probability of closing. We anticipate that higher loans/assets would increase the likelihood of closure because loans are typically a bank's most risky assets. By contrast, we expect that greater liquidity (reflected in higher cash/assets) or capital (reflected in higher capital/assets) would reduce the probability of closure. Finally, older banks might be better managed or have more stable funding, and accordingly we expect that the closure probability was lower for older banks.
We also test whether the farm land boom affected closure rates directly, rather than simply through their impact on bank balance sheets. We include the percent changes in farm land value per acre, mortgage debt per acre, and improved farm acreage between 1910 and 1920, as well as the log of mortgage debt per acre in 1920 to capture the boom. 26 We do not include measures of the bust, such as the change in farm land value during 1920-25, at this point because they might be determined in part by local bank closures. The model takes the form: 1910 and 1920, ,1920 is the value of mortgage debt per acre in county c in 1920, ,1920 is the vector of county census variables used before with some additions noted below, ,1920 is a vector of bank-specific control variables for bank i in 1920, , is the robust error term, and the rest of the values retain their previous definitions. Because the asset price boom measures are observed at the county-level, we cannot include county-fixed effects and instead expand on the county-level controls to include the logarithm of crop value in 1920, average rainfall in the county, the standard deviation of rainfall in the county, the logarithm of county land area (in square miles), logarithm distance in miles to the Mississippi River, logarithm distance in miles to the Atlantic Ocean, logarithm distance in miles to the Great Lakes, and logarithm distance in miles to the Pacific Ocean. 27 The vector of bank-specific variables includes dummies for the entry year of the bank, the logarithm of total assets, loans/assets, capital/assets, and cash/assets in 1920.
We estimate the model on the full sample of banks present in 1920 as well as on a reduced sample of banks that were present in 1914 and survived through 1920. The latter sample allows us to include each bank's percent increase in total loans from 1914 to 1920 to test whether rapid loan growth affected closure probability over and above the location-specific factors. We anticipate that banks with larger percentage increases in loan volume during the boom would have been more likely to close during the bust since rapid growth might reflect aggressive lending associated with less screening of borrowers or a lowering of lending standards. Rapid loan growth has been found to be a characteristic of banks that failed in other settings, such as the 1980s (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 1997). The results for the sample of banks that were established before 1914 are generally similar to those for all banks present in 1920. The age dummies are no longer statistically significant, indicating that the year of establishment mattered little for banks that opened before 1914. We also find that rapid loan growth during the boom increased a bank's probability of closing during the bust. The estimates indicate that a 76.9 percent increase in loans during 1914-20 (i.e., the average percentage change in bank loans in the sample) would have increased the probability of closure by 1.38 percentage points even after controlling for the increase in county farm land value during 1910-20 and bank balance sheet composition in 1920.
As in previous sections, we next examine whether state banking regulations and policies affected closure rates directly (rather than through their effects on bank balance sheets) using interactions with the change in farm land value during 1910-20. If access to the Federal Reserve's discount window provided member banks with a reliable source of liquidity, then they might have been better able to withstand the decline in farm land prices. 28 Deposit insurance might have increased the probability of bank closure during the 1920s by encouraging greater 28 White (2015) argues that the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta lent aggressively to reduce bank distress during the early 1920s.
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risk-taking during the boom or as losses eroded bank net worth during the bust. The effect of double liability on the closure probability is unclear a priori. Although conceivably a deterrent to risk taking, Grossman (2001) speculates that double liability gave bankers an incentive to close sooner than otherwise in order to avoid hitting shareholders with larger losses when banks inevitably failed. Finally, higher capital requirements might be associated with greater buffers for losses as well as higher franchise values.
The results reported in the third and fourth columns indicate that of the policy variables, only deposit insurance had a statistically significant impact on closure probability. The We did not include the change in farm land value during 1920-25 in our base regressions because of the possibility that bank closures had an impact on local land prices. However, we consider whether controlling for the size of the decline in local farm land values affects our estimates of the impacts of the boom and balance sheet variables on bank closure probabilities.
With the explicit understanding that the coefficients are not necessarily causal estimates, we add the percent change in farm land value per acre for 1920-25 to Equation (3) to observe whether bank closures were sensitive to the farm land price bust as well as the boom. Table 7 reports the results of the expanded model. In the first column of each set, the addition of the change in land value per acre for 1920-25 does not qualitatively alter the previous results. The coefficient on the growth of farm land value per acre for 1910-20 remains positive and statistically significant, the balance sheet measures retain their signs and statistical significance, and banks that entered during the war were still more likely to close than banks that existed before the war. For both state and national banks, the probability of closing was negatively correlated with the change in farm land value per acre in the 1920s. That is, a larger decline in local land value increased the probability that a bank would close. The coefficients on 22 the change in land value during 1920-25 are generally not statistically significant, however, unless we omit the policy interaction variables, in which case the coefficient on the change in land value during 1920-25 is statistically significant and larger.
Taking the analysis a step further, we include interactions of the boom and bust variables in the second column of each set. The interaction tests whether the impact of the decline in land prices on bank closure probability depended on the size of the preceding land price boom. The coefficient on interaction is negative and statistically significant for state banks that were established before the war, and nearly so when we estimate the model for all state banks. This indicates that the impact of a given decline in local farm land value per acre during the bust on the probability of closing was greater, the larger the increase in farm land value during the boom.
Comparing two counties with the average change in farm land value during 1920-25 (i.e., 34.9 percent), a state bank in a county that experienced a 25 percent larger rise in farm land value during the 1910s was 1.6 percentage points more likely to close in the early-1920s than a state bank that did not based on the coefficients in column (2) of Table 7 . Because the coefficients for the changes in farm land values in 1910-20 and 1920-25 are no longer statistically significant when we include the interaction terms, it appears that state bank closures were more a reflection of the asset price boom and bust than of simply the decline in farm land values during the bust.
National banks, by contrast, were less consistently affected by instability in farm land prices, likely because they were less involved in agricultural lending than state banks.
The bank-level analysis provides insight into the dynamics surrounding the interplay of bank and agricultural distress during the 1920s. On a macroeconomic level, both the boom and bust affected bank outcomes, but the interaction of these two factors made things even worse, at least for state-chartered banks. That said, microeconomic and regulatory factors also played a role. Banks that opened during the war, expanded their loans during the boom, had higher loans/assets, lower capital/assets, or lower cash/assets were more likely to close during the bust period. Deposit insurance appears to have made banks particularly vulnerable to the boom and bust in farm land values.
Banks and Land Values
The previous sections have shown how the agricultural price shock affected banks. In this section, we explore the impact of banks on the growth of farm land values. Rajan and Ramcharan (2015) show that increases in farm land values during the 1910s were positively correlated with 23 the presence of banks in 1910. Here we aggregate our bank-level data to the county-level to explore further the channels by which banks played a role in the boom and subsequent bust. By including banking system measures and interactions, we get a better sense of the channels by which the price shock drove the land price boom.
Boom!
Similar to the findings of Rajan and Ramcharan (2015) , our results in Table 8 Table 6 indicate that rapid loan growth increased the probability that a bank would close during the bust. Thus, conceivably, the decline in crop prices after 1919 might have had a larger impact on farm land values in counties that had larger growth in bank loans during the boom via increased bank closures and associated loan liquidations as well as reduced credit supply.
The results, reported in Table 9, (Horton, Larsen, and Wall, 1942, p. 3) . Thus, continued lending might have delayed or slowed the decline in land prices resulting from falling crop prices in some regions.
Although the mere presence of banks in 1920 did not generally affect land prices during the bust, changes in local credit supply resulting from bank failures or other closures might have had an impact. To explore this possibility, we augment Equation (5) The number of closures is the most accurate measure of bank distress available, but is likely endogenous to the decline in farm land value. Because of this, in Columns 4-7, we include predicted and arguably exogenous measures of bank closure risk from the regressions reported in Table 6 . Specifically, we obtain the predicted closure probability for each state and national bank from the model in the second and sixth columns of Table 6 , respectively. 30 From there, we count the number of banks that had a predicted closure probability above a particular cutoff (e.g., 30 The median predicted closure probabilities for state and national banks are 10 percent and 6 percent, respectively. The results are similar if we restrict the sample to older banks and include the percentage growth in loans 1914-20 (as in the fourth and seventh columns of Table 6 ) or if we include regulatory interactions (as in the third column of can only reflect predetermined bank-specific values (i.e., bank age and balance sheet variables).
The results indicate that the estimated decline in farm land value is larger, the larger the number of predicted closures of state banks with a probability of closure in excess of 10, 15, or 20 percent. However, the impact of predicted closures on the change in farm land value is not statistically significant when we use the 5 percent cutoff for counting predicted closures, and is never statistically significant for predicted national bank closures. Because the median predicted closure probability was 10 percent, the 5 percent cutoff captures many banks that had a relatively small estimated probability of closing and undoubtedly did not close. 
Conclusion
Banks are often intertwined with asset price booms and busts. However, the complexity of modern financial systems, including banks with extensive branching networks and off-balance sheet activities, can obscure our view of this dynamic. Historical studies can be valuable for revealing fundamental relationships and the effects of different types of policies that might not be apparent in more complex environments. The World War I agricultural boom and post-war bust is a particularly useful episode for studying the interrelationships between banks and assets 31 Estimating the regression for additional cutoff points provides little additional information. The coefficient on predicted state bank closures becomes statistically significant when a cutoff above 5 percent is chosen and remains so for any reasonable value. The coefficient on predicted national bank closures is never negative and significant regardless of the cutoff value chosen. 32 The fact that the coefficients on bank closures for the cutoffs above 5 percent are similar indicates that the results are not driven by banks just over a particular cutoff beyond 5 percent.
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prices. Triggered by the outbreak of war and collapse of European agriculture, rapidly rising commodity prices ignited a farm land price boom in the United States. Prior research has found that banks contributed to the boom, in that locations with more banks ex ante experienced larger increases in land values and mortgage debt (Rajan and Ramcharan 2015) . Here, using bank-level information, we show how banks became enmeshed in the boom. New banks were established and others expanded their lending to accommodate rising demand for credit which in turn helped to push farm land prices higher. Banking regulations and policies influenced the extent to which banks responded to the boom, with higher minimum capital requirements deterring bank entry and loan growth and deposit insurance encouraging more aggressive lending. The World War I asset price boom thus provides supporting evidence for studies of modern crises such as Glaeser, Gottlieb, and Gyourko (2013) as well as a micro-level view of the macroeconomic dynamics studied by authors such as Kindelberger (1978), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and .
Banks were also impacted by the bust. When farm output and land prices collapsed after the war, banks with weak balance sheets and those that had lent most aggressively during the boom were more likely to fail or be acquired than other banks, as were banks that opened during the boom. Deposit insurance was destabilizing in that it amplified the effect of the boom in land values on the closure probabilities of banks when farm prices subsequently collapsed. Bank closures, and by extension banking policies, also played a role in exacerbating the collapse of farm land prices in the 1920s. Controlling for the change in crop prices, counties with more bank closures saw larger declines in crop prices. Thus, banking instability made the collapse of asset prices worse than it would have otherwise been.
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